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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.  
 
Robert Stinson pled guilty to a twenty-six count 
indictment that arose out of a fraud scheme that he operated 
from 2006 to 2010.  Stinson appeals his sentence and argues 
that the District Court improperly applied a fraud 
enhancement, committed procedural error during sentencing, 
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and imposed a sentence that was substantively unreasonable.  
His appeal requires us to define the scope of U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(15)(A), which increases a defendant’s offense level 
by two points when “the defendant derived more than 
$1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial 
institutions as a result of the offense.”  We conclude that the 
enhancement applies only when financial institutions are the 
source of a defendant’s gross receipts.  We will therefore 
vacate Stinson’s judgment of sentence and remand for 




Stinson’s conviction arose from a fraud scheme that 
began in 2006 when he sought investors for a fund called 
Life’s Good S.T.A.B.L. Mortgage Fund, LLC (“Life’s 
Good”).  Around the same time, Stinson also founded the 
Keystone State Corporation, which he used to market the 
fund to potential investors.  The alleged purpose of Life’s 
Good was to originate mortgage loans and Stinson advertised 
the fund as a way for investors to recoup a sixteen percent 
annual return.  Stinson targeted investors with individual 
retirement accounts (“IRAs”) and those who maintained 
accounts with self-directed IRA custodians.  When he began 
his scheme, Stinson primarily solicited money for the fund by 
hiring telemarketers to “cold call” potential investors.  Those 
telemarketers advertised the fund as a risk-free investment.  
 
In reality, Life’s Good was a sham.  Stinson did not 
use investors’ money to make mortgage loans.  Instead, he 
diverted the money to a variety of personal business ventures 
that employed his family and friends without requiring them 
to work.  These businesses, none of which turned a profit, 
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included a healthcare consulting firm, an athlete 
representation company, an online television station, and an 
artist representation agency.       
 
In 2009 and 2010, Stinson expanded his efforts.  He 
created a fictitious prospectus that purported to explain the 
fund’s activity from 2007 to 2008.  The prospectus 
misrepresented the amount originated in mortgage loans, the 
fund’s annual returns, and results from an independent audit 
that never occurred.  Stinson also misrepresented his 
education and employment history and concealed his prior 
convictions for fraud.  In addition, he used false information 
to convince Morningstar, an independent investment rating 
agency, to give Life’s Good funds a favorable rating.  Many 
of the fund’s investors relied on this rating when deciding to 
invest their IRAs with Life’s Good.   
 
 Stinson began to communicate with two independent 
financial advisory firms, Brentwood Financial (“Brentwood”) 
and Total Wealth Management (“TWM”), in 2009.  At least 
one of those firms, Brentwood, was a registered investment 
advisor, which means that the organization had registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  
Stinson’s relationship with these institutions formed the basis 
for the application of the disputed fraud enhancement.  Both 
firms entered into agreements with Stinson to refer investors 
to Life’s Good in exchange for referral fees.  During 2009 
and 2010, Brentwood and TWM used the fund’s fictitious 
marketing materials to solicit numerous investors, who 
collectively invested millions of dollars in the fund.  It 
appears as though the clients of Brentwood and TWM made 
individual decisions to invest with Life’s Good on the advice 
of their investment advisors at each firm.  However, some of 
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the victim impact statements suggest that Brentwood and 
TWM retained control over the assets of certain clients and 
invested in Life’s Good on their behalf.      
 
In June 2010, the SEC initiated a civil enforcement 
action against Stinson.  Stinson eventually admitted to the 
details of his scheme and in November 2010 a grand jury 
returned a twenty-six count indictment that charged him with 
wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, money laundering in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1344, filing false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 
7206(1), obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1505, and making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1001.  The SEC’s analysis of Stinson’s accounts ultimately 
showed that Life’s Good solicited over $17.6 million from at 
least 262 investors and returned approximately $1.9 million.  
Because Stinson targeted those with IRAs, many individuals 
lost part or all of their retirement savings as a result of their 
investments in Life’s Good.   
 
On August 15, 2011, Stinson entered an open guilty 
plea.  He was sentenced on April 10, 2012.  At sentencing, 
Stinson challenged two conclusions contained in the 
presentence investigation report (“PSR”):  that there were 
more than 250 victims of his crime and that he derived more 
than $1 million from financial institutions on the basis that his 
gross receipts totaled less than $1 million.  After hearing 
testimony from an SEC accountant, the District Court rejected 
both of Stinson’s challenges and adopted the PSR, which 
calculated an advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) initial offense level of seven 
and applied five fraud-related sentencing enhancements.  The 
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largest of those enhancements applied a twenty-level increase 
for a total loss amount between $7 million and $20 million.  
The court also imposed the enhancement that is at issue in 
this appeal, an increase of two offense levels because “the 
defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts 
from one or more financial institutions as a result of the 
offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A).  The five fraud 
enhancements, combined with a separate enhancement for 
obstruction of justice and a downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility, resulted in an offense level of 
thirty-eight.  That offense level, combined with Stinson’s 
criminal history category of III, yielded an advisory 
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months of imprisonment.  The 
Government sought an above-Guidelines sentence of 480 
months.  Stinson asked for leniency. 
 
After calculating the advisory Guidelines range, the 
District Court granted the Government’s motion for an 
upward departure, finding that 
 
the defendant’s conduct is just 
abhorrent . . . the injury and the 
distress that he has caused to over 
250 people is not anything that is 
accounted for in the Guidelines, 
that the fraud was massive, that 
his criminal history is not 
reflected in the Guideline 
calculation . . . that this is his fifth 
conviction for fraud.  And he has 
shown himself to be a recidivist of 
the most serious type. . . . [T]he 
consequences of his criminal 
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conduct in this case are immense.  
And I’ve said this in other cases; 
the consequences of criminal 
conduct, in my view, are not 
adequately accounted for under 
the Guidelines.   
 
App. 365-66.  The court then turned to step three of the 
sentencing process and  “reach[ed] the same conclusion” after 
a consideration of the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  App. 367.  The District Court pointed to the need 
for deterrence as a “key factor” and observed that, if Stinson 
were younger, he would probably face a higher sentence.  Id.  
The District Court ultimately sentenced Stinson to a total term 
of 400 months, arriving at that figure by using the high end of 
the advisory Guidelines range, 365 months, and adding 
approximately ten percent, or thirty-five months.  The court 
also ordered restitution in the amount of $14,051,246.   
 
Stinson filed this timely appeal, contending that 
application of  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) was plain error 
and that his sentence was procedurally erroneous and 





We consider first Stinson’s contention that the plain 
language of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) cannot apply to his 
                                              
1  The District Court had jurisdiction over the prosecution of 
this criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over Stinson’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
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conduct because the money flowed from individual investors, 
not financial institutions like Brentwood and TWM.  The 
clear language of the provision and its use of the word 
“derived,” Stinson contends, directs the sentencing court to 
the source of the receipts.  The Government responds that 
application of the provision was not plain error.    
 
At sentencing, a district court must find facts that 
relate to application of the Guidelines by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  United States v. West, 643 F.3d 102, 104-05 
(3d Cir. 2011).  We will ordinarily “exercise plenary review 
over legal questions about the meaning of the [S]entencing 
[G]uidelines” and apply a “clearly erroneous standard to 
factual determinations underlying their application.”  United 
States v. Reynos, 680 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted).  In this 
case, however, Stinson concedes that he did not preserve the 
issue below.2
                                              
2  Stinson objected to application of the enhancement at 
sentencing on the basis that the evidence did not show that he 
had received more than $1,000,000.   
  As a result, we will review for plain error and 
grant relief only if we conclude that (1) there was an error, (2) 
the error was “clear or obvious,” and (3) the error “affected 
the appellant’s substantial rights.”  Puckett v. United States, 
556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); see also United States v. Fumo, 
655 F.3d 288, 325 (3d Cir. 2011).  If those three prongs are 
satisfied, we have “the discretion to remedy the error — 
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error 
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (alteration 
in original) (quotation marks omitted).  Stinson’s appeal 
raises an issue of first impression, but lack of precedent alone 
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will not prevent us from finding plain error.  United States v. 
Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Neither the 
absence of circuit precedent nor the lack of consideration of 
the issue by another court prevents the clearly erroneous 
application of statutory law from being plain error.”); see also 
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 536-38 (3d Cir. 2009) 




To address Stinson’s claim of error, we look first to the 
text of the disputed enhancement, which provides:  “[i]f . . . 
the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts 
from one or more financial institutions as a result of the 
offense, increase by 2 levels.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A).  
“[W]e read Guidelines provisions for their plain meaning.”  
United States v. Greene, 212 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 2000); 
see also   United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“When construing the Guidelines, we look first to the 
plain language, and where that is unambiguous we need look 
no further.” (quotation marks omitted)).  To understand a 
provision’s plain language, we may look to the dictionary for 
guidance.  United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 
2011).  For instance, “derived” means “[r]eceived from [a] 
specified source.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 444 (6th ed. 
1990).  Webster’s Dictionary provides a nearly identical 
definition, defining “derive” as “to take or receive 
esp[ecially] from a specified source.”  Webster’s Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 342 (1986). 
 
The Sentencing Commission amended the provision in 
2001.  Before that, the Guidelines added four offense levels 
“[i]f the offense . . . affected a financial institution and the 
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defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts 
from the offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(6)(B) (2000) 
(emphasis added).  The two requirements — the amount in 
gross receipts and the effect on a financial institution — were 
“separate and distinct prerequisites.”3
 
  Greene, 212 F.3d at 
761.  The “affected” requirement of the pre-2001 version 
encompassed “even minimal impacts” on financial 
institutions.  United States v. Wiant, 314 F.3d 826, 830 (6th 
Cir. 2003).  The requirement that a defendant personally 
derive more than $1 million from the offense operated to limit 
application of the enhancement.  Id.  (“The seriousness of the 
4-point enhancement, of course, reflects the other key 
limitation of this provision — that the defendant derive more 
than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense.”); see also 
United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 193 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(applying pre-2001 enhancement when the defendant 
personally derived more than $1,000,000 and his conduct 
affected financial institutions by exposing them to civil 
litigation and harming their reputations).   
Since the 2001 amendments, no court has specifically 
considered the question we address here:  whether a financial 
                                              
3  In Greene, the Court examined the language once contained 
in § 2F1.1.  Before the 2001 amendments, the Guidelines 
contained the “affected a financial institution” enhancement 
in two places:  § 2B1.1, which then, like now, addressed 
larceny, embezzlement, and other forms of theft, and § 2F1.1, 
which governed offenses involving fraud, deceit, forgery, and 
altered or counterfeit instruments.  The 2001 amendments 
consolidated § 2F1.1 with § 2B1.1, which now addresses 
those offenses formerly governed by § 2F1.1.  See United 
States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 509 n.10 (3d Cir. 2003).    
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institution must be the source of $1 million in gross receipts 
for the enhancement to apply.  However, several of our sister 
courts of appeals have addressed a related issue — whether 
the new language represented a substantive change or simply 
clarified the existing language — to determine whether the 
amended language applies retroactively.  Each court to 
address the issue has concluded that the change was a 
substantive one.  In United States v. Hartz, for instance, the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that “by 
focusing on the amount derived from the financial institutions 
rather than the amount derived from the offense as a whole,” 
the new language “substantively change[d] the requirements 
for applying the guideline.”   296 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 
2002).  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered 
the same question and described the new language as “more 
lenient” than the pre-2001 provision — that is, more generous 
to defendants and more difficult for the Government to 
satisfy.  United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 819 (9th 
Cir. 2009).  Under the old language, the court observed, “any 
impact on a financial institution” would justify imposition of 
the four-level enhancement.  Id.  The new language, however, 
makes “equally clear that the enhancement only applies if 
gross receipts in excess of $1 million are derived from a 
financial institution.”  Id.  “Under [the new] language, the 
only effect on a financial institution that counts is money 
flowing from a financial institution into the defendant’s 
coffers.”  Id.; see also United States v. Amico, 573 F.3d 150, 
151 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding “that the 2001 
amendment substantively changes an unambiguous provision 
and therefore does not apply retroactively”); United States v. 
Swanson, 360 F.3d 1155, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); 





The 2001 amendments to the language altered the 
source that would trigger application of the enhancement.  
Before, a defendant need only have derived $1 million from 
the offense conduct.  The portion that addressed financial 
institutions remained separate.  Now, however, the language 
of the provision merges the formerly separate requirements of 
source and profit.  We ultimately need look no further than 
the plain language of the disputed enhancement, which 
applies a two-level increase if “the defendant derived more 
than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial 
institutions as a result of the offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(15)(A).  The word “derived” directs us to determine 
the source of the funds.   
 
We thus hold that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) will 
apply when the evidence shows that a financial institution,4
                                              




“Financial institution” includes any institution 
described in 18 U.S.C. § 20, § 656, § 657, § 1005, § 
1006, § 1007, or § 1014; any state or foreign bank, 
trust company, credit union, insurance company, 
investment company, mutual fund, savings (building 
and loan) association, union or employee pension 
fund; any health, medical, or hospital insurance 
association; brokers and dealers registered, or required 
to be registered, with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; futures commodity merchants and 
commodity pool operators registered, or required to be 
registered, with the Commodity Futures Trading 
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not an individual, was the source of the $1 million in gross 
receipts.  A financial institution is a source of a defendant’s 
gross receipts if it owns the funds.  Hence, a financial 
institution is a source of the gross receipts when it exercises 
dominion and control over the funds and has unrestrained 
discretion to alienate the funds.  A financial institution is not 
the source of all funds that have passed through the 
institution, as might occur during a simple wire transfer.  
Accordingly, mere tangential effects on financial institutions 
will not support application of the enhancement.5
                                                                                                     
Commission; and any similar entity, whether or not 
insured by the federal government.  “Union or 
employee pension fund” and “any health, medical, or 
hospital insurance association,” primarily include large 
pension funds that serve many persons (e.g., pension 
funds of large national and international organizations, 
unions, and corporations doing substantial interstate 
business), and associations that undertake to provide 
pension, disability, or other benefits (e.g., medical or 
hospitalization insurance) to large numbers of persons. 
     
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n.1.   
5  Courts have taken a similar approach to interpreting 18 
U.S.C. § 1957(a), a money laundering statute that punishes an 
offender who “knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a 
monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value 
greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful 
activity.”  Though different courts of appeals have different 
requirements that govern the extent to which proceeds must 
flow from illegal activities, all have looked to the source of 
the proceeds. See United States v. Hetherington, 256 F.3d 





 With this understanding of “derived,” we turn to 
Stinson’s argument:  that the District Court improperly 
applied U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A)’s two-level increase to 
him.  The District Court applied the enhancement on the basis 
of Brentwood’s and TWM’s involvement in Stinson’s 
scheme.  The Government claims that application of the 
enhancement was not plain error because Stinson persuaded 
the firms to market his fund to their clients, received 
substantial sums from their efforts, and exposed Brentwood 
and TWM to liability from its clients. 
 
The pre-2001 provision may well have applied to 
Stinson’s conduct — the Government describes outcomes that 
potentially “affected” Brentwood and TWM.  However, from 
the record currently before us, it does not appear that these 
facts satisfy the definition of “derived” set forth in this 
opinion because Brentwood and TWM were not the source of 
Stinson’s gross receipts.  But we are unable to conclude 
definitively that the enhancement does not apply because the 
                                                                                                     
for the wire transfer” to determine from where defendant 
derived the money); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 
409 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the source of the proceeds 
may be “commingled with funds obtained from legitimate 
sources”); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 
318 (6th Cir. 2010) (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) 
promotional money laundering claim and looking to the 
“money from illegal sources” to determine whether the 
proceeds of unlawful activity were involved (quotation marks 




record is unclear as to whether Brentwood or TWM invested 
any money on behalf of their clients.  The record as 
developed on remand may indeed support application of the 
enhancement.   
 
Application of the fraud enhancement on the current 
record, however, was error.  That error was clear in light of 
the plain language of the relevant Guidelines provision and 
the evidence before the District Court.  United States v. 
Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
the error was “‘plain,’ given the clarity of the statutory 
language”).  The enhancement increased Stinson’s offense 
level by two, which in turn increased his advisory Guidelines 
range.  The District Court used that advisory range to 
calculate the above-Guidelines sentence it ultimately 
imposed.  A sentencing error that results in a longer sentence 
“undoubtedly affects substantial rights,” United States v. 
Portillo-Mendoza, 273 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(quotation marks omitted), and “affect[s] the outcome of the 
district court proceedings,” United States v. Andrews, 681 
F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) 
(quotation marks omitted).  See also United States v. Knight, 
266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that application 
of an incorrect Guidelines range is presumptively prejudicial, 
even if the sentence imposed also falls within the correct 
range).  Imposition of the fraud enhancement on the existing 
record was therefore plain error.  Because that error 
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 





We will therefore vacate and remand for the District 
Court to reconsider application of  U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(15)(A) in light of this opinion and to resentence 
Stinson accordingly.6
 
    
III. 
 
In accordance with the foregoing, we will vacate 
Stinson’s judgment of sentence and will remand for 
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.   
 
                                              
6  Stinson also alleges three procedural errors.  First, he 
suggests that the District Court stated during sentencing that it 
would grant the motion for an upward departure but indicated 
in its “Statement of Reasons” that it had not done so.  As a 
result, Stinson argues, it is unclear from the record whether 
the District Court believed it was departing upward at step 
two or varying upward pursuant to the § 3553(a) factors at 
step three.  Second, Stinson contends that the District Court 
did not specify how any departure at step two affected 
Stinson’s advisory Guidelines range and improperly blended 
steps two and three of the proper sentencing procedure.  
Third, Stinson argues that the District Court only addressed 
his criminal history, the basis of the Government’s departure 
motion, in the course of its assessment of the § 3553(a) 
factors, which occurs at step three.  Because we must remand 
to the District Court for resentencing, we need not resolve 
Stinson’s procedural objections.   
